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INTRODUCTION
Norms have attracted much attention.' One of Karl Llewellyn's
most significant innovations in drafting the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) was the incorporation of norms, or customary
practices, among merchants.2 More recently, Robert Ellickson's
detailed account of Shasta County has put norms back onto center
stage.
3
A fundamental question that emerges from this literature
involves the relationship between norms and law. To put this
question in its sharpest and most interesting form: Under what
circumstances should courts enforce the norms of private parties?
In Shasta County, where norms, not laws, apparently govern cattle
trespass and fencing disputes among ranchers, should the courts
enforce these norms? For Ellickson, the answer seems relatively
clear: If one concludes that the norms of close-knit groups are
generally efficient, then when a close-knit group acts in contexts in
which it is unable to impose losses on members, a utilitarian judge
should defer, for example, to the customs of merchants or cattle
1 For these purposes, we will follow one useful definition of norms as "rules or
standards enforced solely by private (that is, non-state) actors." In this usage, the
term "norm" is largely descriptive: What is it that we observe parties doing? In this
sense, we, like others, use the term in its sociological meaning. This must be
distinguished from the use of the term in a "normative" sense, for example, "in this
society, there is a norm against cheating." While the two uses are often related, they
are distinct.
For important recent contributions, see, for example, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extra-Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industy,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765
(1996); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697
(1996); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996).
The discussion of the relation between norms or custom and law is, of course,
one of the ancient debates of the law, stretching back centuries. One can approach
the question from an historical perspective, a conceptual perspective, a sociological
perspective, or an ideological perspective. In this Article, we approach it from what
can best be called either an economic or a functional perspective.
2 For a careful historical account, see Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision:
Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 492-538 (1987).
3 See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 15-28.
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ranchers engaged in repeat dealings.4 Llewellyn arrived at a similar
conclusion. In numerous provisions, the UCC incorporates
commercial practice into the terms of the contract.5
From this perspective, if the norm in Shasta County is that cattle
owners are not liable for occasional trespasses or that adjoining
landowners split the cost of a common fence in proportion to the
number of cattle, then a utilitarian judge should incorporate these
norms into the interpretation of the contract between such parties,
if a dispute arises and results in litigation. Indeed, these under-
standings might even suffice to show the existence of a contract
between the parties. If one rancher is willing to go to the trouble
of suing an adjoining rancher for the damages caused by a trespass-
ing animal or the cost of fencing, perhaps the judge should adopt
the norms that actually govern their interactions, rather than refuse
to recognize any enforceable agreement or adopt the prevailing and
partially inconsistent legal rules.
In this Article, we approach the question from a different
perspective, drawing on the theory of incentive-compatible contract-
ing and its application, the theory of internal labor markets (ILM).6
In examining the relationship between norms and law, we shift from
the somewhat marginal case of cattle ranching to the more central
and complex case of the employment relationship.' The employ-
ment relationship is particularly interesting because, unlike Shasta
4 See id. at 255.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205(2) ("Usage of trade" means "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as tojustfy
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.");
U.C.C. § 1-205(1) ("Course of dealing" means "a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct."); U.C.C. § 2-208(1) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated
occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to
determine the meaning of the agreement."); U.C.C. § 2-314(3) ("Unless excluded or
modified... other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of
trade.").
6 The "internal labor market," or "ILM," refers to the network of arrangements,
understandings, and agreements that constitute the employment relationship within
firms, as distinguished from relationships in the external employment market.
'We view cattle ranching as marginal for two related reasons. First, the amounts
at issue in the disputes are small and relatively infrequent (except for the accidents
with third party motorists which inevitably are governed by law); and second, they
tend to be reciprocally distributed. These features yield a relatively simple set of
solutions: "live and let live;" "fair shares," etc.
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County, it involves numerous interactions among repeat players
over a long period of time. In Shasta County, as in Ronald Coase's
cases,' the parties enter into occasional side-deals to surmount
potential harm. In the employment relationship, by contrast, the
parties seek an ongoing relationship and generate incentive-
compatible contracts that they intend to be self-enforcingo
The similarities and differences between the ILM and Shasta
County generate a number of interesting questions. What is the
relationship between the norm-governed interactions of Shasta
County's ranchers and a firm's internal labor markets? In both
cases, the factors that generate Ellickson's results are present.
Ellickson's basic claim is that norms arise in close-knit groups, and
that the norms controlling the workaday relationship of such groups
will enhance overall welfare."0 In addition, the groups have an
intricate information sharing mechanism that facilitates the
identification and punishment of those who violate the norms.
Moreover, in studying the employment relationship, we can
evaluate the workings of two distinct types of relationships.
Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act system ("NLRA
system") provides a bifurcated labor market: employment relation-
ships that utilize norms, the non-union sector, and employment
relationships that utilize law, the union sector."1 By studying how
these two different frameworks operate, we can begin to evaluate
the extent to which norms mirror laws, when parties are more likely
to choose norms over law, and vice versa, and the extent to which
the parties bargain over the same issues.
Drawing on ILM theory, we examine the question of the
relationship between norms and law by considering the two central
principles of the non-union employment relationship: the use of an
informal governance process to run the relationship, coupled with
at-will employment to resolve the question as to how the relation-
ship might be terminated. The legal doctrine of at-will employment
s See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
" To call such relationships "contracts" is slightly but harmlessly misleading. From
a legal perspective, to call an arrangement a "contract" is typically to say that it is
legally enforceable. By contrast, "incentive-compatible contracts" are typically not
enforceable. In the economics literature, the term contracts is used interchangeably
with agreements, independent of whether they are intended to be enforceable.
10 See ELUCKSON, supra note 1, at 167-82. The phrase "close-knit groups" refers
to groups in which parties repeatedly interact and have the power to administer
sanctions in the future. See id.
"1 We use the term "NLRA system" to mean the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and the associated case law.
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provides a particularly interesting case for examining the relation-
ship between norms and law. In non-union workplaces, a clear
norm exists that an employer will not discharge an employee
without cause. As we will see, this norm can be understood to arise
in response to the distinctive contracting problems that exist: the
combination of match-specific investments," information asymme-
try, and transaction costs that create both the potential for joint
gains as well as the threat of opportunistic behavior. This norm
coexists with the traditional (and apparently inconsistent) legal rule
that, in the absence of an explicit contract establishing a specific
term of employment, an employer generally can discharge an
employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all (the
doctrine of "at-will employment"). Even where judicial decision or
statute has diluted this rule, when parties are free to provide for at-
will employment by contract, they generally do so) The question
can thus be rephrased as: Assuming that the general norm in
workplaces, at least when there are investments in match, is "no
discharge without cause," should the courts enforce that provision
as a term of the implied or explicit employment contract between
employees and the firm?
We argue that in this case the courts should generally not
enforce norms, unless the parties go to the trouble of writing them
into their contracts. In taking this position, we reject the "tradition-
al labor law" scholars' near unanimous condemnation of the
doctrine of at-will employment as a one-sided contract that makes
employers better off and employees worse off. The traditional view
lacks an appreciation that norms, as well as collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs), can govern the employment relationship in a
manner that serves the interests of both parties. Our norm-based
theory better tracks how the parties themselves structure their
relationship in the great majority of cases.
This then raises a further and separate issue: When will
parties choose norms over laws, and vice versa? As we will see be-
low, a system in which parties can choose between norms and
UA match-specific investment is one which has value when used by the parties to
the match, but no value otherwise.
"5 When, for instance, individuals attempt to limit the at-will employment doctrine
by interpreting an employee handbook as promising employment for a specified term,
proponents of the at-will doctrine can return the default to "at-will" by inserting clear
language to the effect that nothing in the handbook should be understood to limit
the employer's ability to discharge the employee at any time. See Richard H. Winters,
Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE L.J. 196, 218.
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contracts potentially disciplines and improves each. Ellickson
does not address this point in his depiction of Shasta County,
which suggests that his claim that norms-apart from and unin-
fluenced by the law-can structure social life may not be generaliz-
able beyond the low stakes, low transaction cost context of Shasta
County.
In Part I, we review the ILM literature and argue that norms are
an example of the more general phenomenon of self-enforcing,
incentive-compatible contracts, that is, contracts that self-enforce,
without the need for third party intervention. These contracts
encourage parties to maximize their joint welfare. In reviewing this
literature, we argue that norms, not laws, govern the internal labor
markets of non-union firms, even more so than cattle ranching in
Shasta County.
In Part II, we draw on the ILM literature to clarify the relation-
ship between norms and law. Based on this literature, we argue that
making the incentive-compatible contracts among close-knit groups
legally enforceable often does not, and would not, further the
interests of the group. On the contrary, because of the information
and transaction costs that give rise to the particular structures in the
first place, legal intervention is likely to be, and to be perceived to
be, inconsistent with the (ex ante) desires of the parties. Under this
analysis, the incorporation of custom into law should only occur
when the parties themselves choose to write contracts and incorpo-
rate norms by reference. 4
Finally, in Part III, we tentatively propose a more general theory
of the relationship between the domains of norms and contracts.
We argue that the principle difference between norms and contracts
14 Some argue that courts should not enforce norms because to do so favors the
rich and powerful over the poor and weak. According to this argument, the courts
should impose standards that protect the weak to a greater extent than do the
prevailing norms. In the area of labor law, for example, traditional labor law scholars
view employment norms as unilaterally imposed by employers and inadequate to
protect employees. See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 48-104 (1990). While we likewise reject at
least some court enforcement of norms, our alternative-namely, leaving the parties
to their own governance structures-is quite different. In essence, we argue that when
the courts do not enforce norms, they should yield to alternative governance
structures-that is, play a passive role while those who reject norms as insufficiently
protective of the weak would argue that rather than refusing to enforce norms at all,
courts should enforce standards more favorable to the poor-that is, play a more
active role. The difference between these two views revolves around the presence of
effects on third parties, the voluntariness of participation in the norm, and the
normative implications of consent.
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lies in the greater binding power provided by state enforcement.
Based on this, we argue that parties are more likely to choose state
enforcement when the potential for opportunistic behavior is too
great to be constrained by norms. The bipolar distribution between
norms and detailed contracts that characterizes both ILMs and
commercial relational contracting reflects a consequence of the
bipolar choice between self-enforcing norms and third party
enforcement. We then turn to the benefits of preserving the choice
between norms and law and argue that the legal option likely plays
a significant role in protecting norm-governed transactions against
opportunistic behavior.
I. THE THEORY OF INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE CONTRACTS,
ILMs, AND SHASTA COUNTY
A. The Physical Reality of Shasta County
Shasta County presents neighbors dealing with potential
problems of negative externalities, such as roaming cattle. Most of
the disputes involve adjacent landowners so that the transaction
costs in each occurrence are small, as are the damages from each
harmful event. Given the recurring nature of the interactions,
coupled with the ability of each party to benefit or harm the other,
the residents settle their accounts through reciprocal acts rather
than through monetary payments.
In Ellickson's account of these disputes, several features stand
out. First, norms-not legal rules-are the fundamental sources of
entitlements and the fundamental normative structures that govern
the relationships among the members of the community. The
parties utilize norms, in part, out of ignorance of the law, but
primarily because the individuals in the community view their
norms as satisfying their needs. Second, in pursuing remedial
actions, residents first attempt to resolve the dispute on their own.
They may, for example, take action to harm the reputation of the
wrongdoer. If that proves insufficient, they resort to physical acts
of self-help, including the seizing of livestock, even if such acts are
unlawful."5 If that also fails, they may complain to public officials.
These complaints rarely trigger official sanctions, only the possible
threat of such actions." Only as a last resort, and this appears to
" See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 218.
16 See id. at 57-58.
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happen rarely, do ranchers seek "attorney assisted claims."
17
Indeed, one of the strongest norms in Shasta County is the norm
against going to court to seek monetary or other relief. Finally,
Ellickson claims that these norms differ significantly from the rules
that a court would apply."
B. The Physical Realities of the Internal Labor Market
The nature of the ongoing employment relationship within
firms, the ILM, is much more complex than is the ongoing Shasta
County relationship. In the ILM, many employee-participants
operate in a hierarchical organizational structure. In contrast to the
occasional and typically unwanted nuisances that characterize the
Shasta County scenario, the ILM parties engage in a continuous,
beneficial working relationship.
A distinctive feature of the ILM is that it is a structured
arrangement with its own set of informal rules governing wages,
hours of work, promotion opportunities, grievance procedures, and
other terms and conditions of employment. Most hiring takes place
in a limited number of entry-level jobs. Based on performance,
employees are then promoted, retained in position, or discharged.
There are two very different arrangements for the ILM. The
non-union sector employs approximately ninety percent of private
sector workers."9 The non-union ILM can be described as a close-
knit group, and the governance arrangement can be described as a
norm in the Ellickson sense of the term. Because of the repeat-play
17 Id. at 62.
" Ellickson fails to clarify whether Shasta County's norms are ex ante Pareto
superior or Kaldor-Hicks superior. In the former case, all parties are better off, in
the latter, the overall community is better off, although some individuals may not be.
There is no evidence to support the stronger conclusion of Pareto superiority. The
weaker claim, that the norms are ex ante Kaldor-Hicks superior, is, however,
compelling.
If membership in Ellickson's close-knit groups were entirely voluntary, the norms
would be Pareto superior. But this is not the case. Shasta County's norms work
because of the disgrace of a bad reputation and nasty self-help moves by aggrieved
parties. Residents may be negatively affected even if they have not made a voluntary
commitment to observe the norms.
Following Hoffman and Spitzer, Ellickson appears to argue that the norms are
Lockean contracts. See id. at 143; see also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of
Distributive Justice, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 264-66 (1985) (discussing Locke's theory
of distributive justice).
19 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY & PUBLIC POLICY 452 tbl. 13.1 (5th ed. 1994).
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nature of the ILM contacts, the parties have broad power to
administer sanctions, and information sharing takes place to allow
the parties to understand the governance arrangements. Moreover,
unwritten and unenforceable agreements govern the relationship,
and the parties eschew any third party enforcement. Finally, at least
the procedural rules that govern the relationship differ substantially
from the rules that would apply if the parties unionized.
For these reasons, we can tell the same type of story for the non-
union sector that Ellickson tells for Shasta County. Moreover,
although Shasta County is but one example, the non-union sector
story, if told in terms of stylized empirical regularities, explains
behavior across the great bulk of non-union ILMs.
C. The Norms of the Internal Labor Market
In the non-union ILM literature, commentators generally agree
that an array of stylized regularities exists.2" Generally: wages
increase with seniority; a business downturn results in employee
layoffs rather than wage reductions; if layoffs occur, junior workers
lose their jobs before senior workers; discharges are for cause; if an
employer catches an employee shirking, the employer will discharge
the employee rather than reduce his wages; and if firms discharge
older workers before younger workers, they do so through voluntary
retirement mechanisms in which the firm buys out the "contract" of
the older worker. Prior to laws against mandatory retirement, firms
would allow older workers with below satisfactory productivity to
reach the mandatory retirement age and would not dismiss these
employees.
2 1
These practices are puzzling from a "legal centrist" perspec-
tive. 22 In each of these cases, the firm could, legally, fire the
workers or reduce wages unilaterally and would seem to have an
incentive to do so; yet they usually follow a different course of
action. Why does the firm provide incentive payments to induce a
20 The ILM literature takes these stylized facts as given, and seeks an explanation
for their persistence. There is general agreement that these stylized facts describe the
general practice in non-union firms, even if there are departures in various firms at
various times. See Michael H. Riordan & Michael L. Wachter, What Do Implicit
Contracts Do? 3 (Dec. 1982) (unpublished discussion paper for the Center for the
Study of Organizational Innovation, on file with author); Sherwin Rosen, Implicit
Contracts: A Survey, 23J. ECON. LITERATURE 1144-75 (1985).
21 See Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatoty Retirement?, 87 J. POL. EcoN.
1261, 1261-84 (1979).
22 See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 137-47.
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senior employee to retire when it could simply discharge the
employee? Why do firms pay severance pay when they could simply
fire a worker? Why do wages increase with age, even when one
might have reason to believe that older workers are less productive
than younger workers? Why do firms typically lay offjunior workers
before senior workers in the event of a business downturn when
senior workers cost more and may be less productive? Why do
firms incur the greater loss of discharging or laying off workers
when a business downturn occurs (and run the risk of losing those
workers' skills and experience), rather than responding by reducing
wages? Why, when workers are, to a large degree, legally unprotect-
ed, do they nonetheless receive these protections?
The ILM literature shows that these initially puzzling but
persistent features of the employment relationship-features that are
common to both the union and non-union sectors,. but do not occur
in the ever present external labor market-can be understood as
terms adopted by the parties to allow them to solve a set of strategic
problems that threatenjoint-profit maximization. Labor economists
distinguish between two fundamentally different labor markets. .The
external labor market (ELM) is the market in which firms seek to fill
vacancies and workers search for new jobs. The textbook ELM
breaks down according to the general skills of the workers, covers
broad geographical regions, and contains large numbers of firms
and workers. Hence, both the supply and demand sides of the
market have numerous parties. Since employers and employees
have no investments that are specific to the relationship, the
relationship can be terminated at low cost. As a result, ELMs are
typically competitive markets, with little potential for successful
rent-seeking.
23
But, as long recognized, the textbook ELM fails to describe the
employment relationship observed within both union and non-union
firms.24 In the observed ILM, firms and workers both make invest-
' "Rent-seeking," for our purposes, means the expenditure of resources or efforts
by one party in order to transfer resources from the other party to itself. This
investment by the rent-payers wastes thejoint profits of the parties because it creates
no new wealth. Moreover, rent-seeking by one party typically causes the prospective
rent-payer to expend resources in order to protect its share of the joint investment.
In ELMs, because there are no joint investments, there is no possibility of rent-
seeking.
24 
See PETER B. DORINGER & MICHAELJ. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 2 (1971) (positing that jobs within the internal market are
shielded from direct influences of competition in the external market).
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ments in their match, investments that are lost if the relationship
terminates. These investments encompass the identification and
training of employees, as well as joint investments in the organiza-
tion of work in a firm. Once tied together in the ILM, relevant
information is asymmetrically distributed. Firms have private
information as to product market conditions and available technolo-
gies, while workers have information advantages with respect to
their own work efforts and opportunity wages in alternative jobs.
As a result, the ILM, unlike the ELM, is not a competitive market
but, rather, can better be modeled as a bilateral monopoly with
considerable potential for rent-seeking.
Why might firms and workers voluntarily eschew the competitive
ELM, with the protections that come from competition, for the
bilateral monopoly of the ILM? The ILM literature offers two
explanations for this phenomenon. First, ILMs generate surpluses
over the returns available in the ELM, surpluses sufficiently large
that they leave both parties better off even after the costs imposed
by rent-seeking behavior. Second, the ILM structures constrain
rent-seeking behavior. Another question-central to this Article-
emerges here: Under what circumstances will the parties choose to
constrain such behavior through norms, and under what circum-
stances will they opt for written contracts?
ILM theorists have identified three central economic factors that
affect an ongoing employment relationship and that are necessary
to explain the above summarized ILM patterns: (1) match-specific
investments, (2) asymmetric information, and (3) transaction
costs. 25 Relying on a combination of these factors, ILM theorists
have been able to analyze the otherwise puzzling features described
above as incentive-compatible contracts designed to solve the twin
problems endemic to ILMs, namely, to encourage the optimal
match-specific investments while deterring the parties from using
their asymmetric information in a rent-seeking manner.
26
From this perspective, one can understand why both the firm
and the worker typically invest in the match: It encourages the
maintenance of the relationship. If only one party made such a
commitment, the noninvesting party could "hold up" the other
party, threatening to terminate the relationship unless that party
I See Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor
Markets, 29 INDUS. REL. 240, 244 (1990).
' Incentive-compatible contract terms are defined as terms that provide incentives
to both parties to maximize the joint surplus available to them.
1923
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paid a higher return. Such a threat would be credible because the
investing party (but not the threatening party) would lose the return
on its match-specific investment. By contrast, joint investments
deter such behavior: because the threatening party would absorb a
loss in carrying out its threat to terminate the relationship,
the opportunity to use such a threat in a rent-seeking manner
diminishes.
27
Similarly, the ILM literature provides a general analysis of
the termination of the employment relationship: discharge for
cause and permanent reductions in force. In each of these cases,
the observed practices manifest a preference for permanent
reductions in employment over less severe adjustments. While this
fact may initially appear to conflict with the presumed interest of
the parties in maintaining the employment relationship, the
employment reduction of firms is indeed incentive-compatible for
joint-profit maximization, while less severe adjustments would not
be.
For example, firms rarely make minor reductions in wages when
they discover worker dereliction. Instead, they typically discharge
the worker, thereby terminating the relationship. The explanation
for this practice rests on an irreducible asymmetry of information:
workers know their work effort; firms do not. Firms can learn by
monitoring, but constant monitoring is very costly. To save on
costs, firms infrequently monitor workers. If most shirking goes
undetected because of high monitoring costs, firms must penalize
employees an amount greater than the expected loss of any specific
incident.
A low detection rate thus accounts for the seeming paradox of
a harsh penalty, discharge, for relatively minor incidences of
shirking. The paradox manifests the classical law enforcement
problem originally investigated by Becker and Stigler.2 8 Employees
will not shirk as long as the expected penalty for shirking equals or
27 Other examples of incentive-compatible terms include seniority clauses, wage
profiles that increase with experience, reductions in employment rather than wages
during declines in economic activity, and unilateral implementation by firms of
decisions affecting levels of output and product prices. For a discussion of these
features, see Riordan & Wachter, supra note 20, at 6-8.
21 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 170 (1968) (studying the optimal amount of law enforcement and its
relationship to the costs of catching and convicting offenders); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526 (1970) (posing a rational
enforcement theory of law enforcement).
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exceeds the benefit from shirking. The ILM parties have two
parameters to control the expected penalty-the probability of
detection and the actual (as distinct from expected) penalty.
Because any expenditure on detection reduces the joint surplus,
risk-neutral parties would minimize the probability of detection and
offset its impact on the expected penalty by raising the actual
penalty, that is, setting the penalty for detection equal to the
maximum amount that the shirker could pay. Specifically, the firm
must set the penalty so that the expected cost of shirking exceeds
the benefit to the employee. When detection rates are low, firms
set the penalty very high to raise the expected value to required
levels.
Conversely, to encourage workers to consummate work effort,
firms must reward employees when the firm learns of superior
effort. Promotions serve this purpose. Rewards, as well as
penalties, appear to exceed the benefits conferred on the firm of
specific proof of consummate work. The reason is the same. Since
most consummate work goes undetected, the reward must be high
enough so that the expected reward exceeds the cost to the
employee of consummate work effort.29
But why not penalize the shirking employee through an equally
harsh large wage reduction? If the employer could simply declare
that an employee had shirked and cut her wage, the employer would
have an incentive to overstate the degree of shirking, thereby
reducing costs and increasing profits. Forcing the employer to
discharge workers eliminates the firm's incentive to overstate the
degree of shirking because it forces firms to lose valued workers in
the process.
A parallel explanation applies to the observed behavior of firms
in response to cyclical changes in output: firms typically reduce
employment rather than wage rates. The firm knows about product
market conditions; the worker does not. The firm informs its work
force about product market conditions indirectly through changes
in output. If a firm could lower wages in response to a decline in
its product market, it would have an incentive to misstate the
condition of its product market in order to lower wage rates. The
incentive-compatible rule is for the firm to lay off workers. Because
layoffs result in a reduction in output, and hence a reduction in the
9 See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments As Optimum
Labor Contracts, 89J. POL. EcON. 841 (1981).
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firm's revenues and profits, such a rule eliminates the firm's
incentive to misstate information.
The rules concerning firms exiting an industry parallel those
governing temporary layoffs. A firm retains the right to decide
unilaterally to go out of business, just as the worker enjoys the
unilateral right to quit the firm. The process of going out of
business typically occurs in several stages. Stylized rules governing
the "effects" on workers of the decision to close have evolved: firms
typically lay off workers over time using a seniority schedule;
workers typically receive some severance pay and always receive
their pension rights; and if the firm discharges older workers before
younger workers, it typically does so through voluntary retirement
mechanisms where it buys out the "contracts" of the older workers.
These process rules, which characterize the non-union ILM, are
almost always included in union contracts as well.
The rule that firms can unilaterally implement the multi-steps of
going out of business has strong incentive-compatible properties.
Once out of business, the firm has lost whatever value is in the ILM,
and hence will only close when the ILM is indeed unprofitable. The
rules governing the process control the firm's incentives to profit
from the process, by imposing direct costs (severance pay or
voluntary retirement programs) and indirect costs (laying off less
expensive junior workers before more expensive senior workers) on
such a firm.
The old rule that firms would allow employees to retire when
they approached the mandatory retirement age, rather than
discharge such employees for bad performance, also had strong
incentive-compatible properties. Older workers, at least in this
prior regime of mandatory retirement, tended to be in the stage of
their career when they were recouping the benefits of earlier
investments in match. In this stage, employers would have an
inicentive to discharge the employees for small lapses or no lapses
at all. The norm against discharging such employees prevented the
employer from capturing the employee's return on investment.
Each of these practices is a "norm" in precisely the sense in
which the practices of ranchers in Shasta County are norms: they
are practices that parties adopt and follow in an ongoing relation-
ship, practices that are largely not legally enforceable. Parties
invent these practices or they evolve in order to constrain opportu-
nistic behavior that stands in the way of joint-profit maximization
when match-specific investments, asymmetric information, and
transaction costs characterize the relationship. Finally, and
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most importantly from the perspective of norms, the practices are
incentive-compatible and largely self-enforcing; that is, the par-
ties have incentives to abide by the norms, without third party
enforcement.
D. The Union Internal Labor Market
The union ILM operates very differently from the non-union
ILM. In the union sector, a detailed collective bargaining agree-
ment governs the parties' relationship, with the agreement enforce-
able in contract law or by an arbitrator who settles disputes by
filling in the gaps in the existing contract."0
In the Ellickson terminology, the union ILM, like the non-union
ILM, is a close-knit group. As is true in the non-union sector, the
union ILM involves repeat relationships, the parties have broad
power to administer sanctions, and information sharing takes place
to allow the parties to understand the governance arrangements.
Contrary to Ellickson's prediction, however, the union ILM
functions through a complex set of statutory obligations enforced
through the NLRA system and contract law, with the parties
making frequent appeals to the NLRB, to courts, and to arbitration.
In the union ILM, the parties do not just bargain in the shadow
of the law, they frequently argue their positions before administra-
tive law judges and arbitrators in time consuming and costly
litigation.
Note, however, that the parties to the collective bargaining
agreements write explicit terms that enforce the stylized behavior of
the non-union ILM parties. Generally, wages increase with
seniority, firms lay off employees in a downturn following a
seniority schedule, firms discharge employees rather than reduce
their wages if the firms prove that employees are shirking, and
permanently laid-off workers receive some severance pay.
In addition, the scope of the collective bargaining agreement is
similar to the scope of the non-union agreement. The union
contract, like the non-union norms, covers wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. It rarely includes contract
terms or norms that significantly limit the employer's ability to
direct the firm. Although many traditional labor law scholars have
" The NLRA system governs the procedures for unionizing and drafting a
collective bargaining agreement.
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advocated the characterization of employees as quasi-joint owners
of the firm, that has not occurred.3'
The difference is thus limited to what might be described,
according to the Ellickson framework, as the procedural and
constitutive norms. The NLRA contains considerable rules
governing the certification of unions. Both the employer and the
union must act in a manner that does not violate a series of rules
governing unfair labor practices. The parties may resort, as noted
above, to the NLRB for violations of the NLRA and to arbitration
and the courts for violations of the collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, while the non-union norms are intended to be self-enforcing,
the union contracts are enforced by third parties.
E. Relational Commercial Contracts
Relational commercial contracts are similar to ILMs and
include match-specific labor investments that are not brought inside
the firm. Subcontracting arrangements and personal service
contracts are two examples of relational labor contracts. Non-
labor examples include merchants in continuing commercial
relationships32 and long-term relationships between suppliers and
customers.
3 3
Relational contracts, unlike other commercial contracts, are
ongoing. As is true for the ILM, ongoing relationships are efficient
when there are opportunities for investments in the match that will
generate a surplus beyond what sequential contracting across
different parties can achieve. As is true in the labor case, the sunk
investments in match give rise to quasi-rents and the potential for
opportunistic behavior. Hence, neither side can go forward without
protection.
The generic relational contract is a mix of contract terms and
norms. In the case of merchants interacting repeatedly in relatively
small-stakes transactions, Macaulay showed that the norms that
s1 For excellent statements of the traditional labor law approach, see JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 173 (1983); WILLIAM
B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE LAW 128 (1993).
12 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminay Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (explaining how what merchants do differs from what
contract law prescribes).
33 
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 91-95 (1975) (discussing incentive compatibility and its
relationship to incomplete long-term contracts).
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governed their interactions differed significantly from the doctrines
of contract law that a court would apply. In place of the legal rules,
one observes a set of workaday norms that, at least from the parties'
perspective, serves to maximize their joint profits. But, as a feature
of relational contracts, the norms are insufficiently self-enforcing
and the parties thus choose to include explicit contract terms as
well.
The paradigm relational contract in the law and economics
literature is the coal mine next to the power plant.3 4 It is in
the parties' joint interest, ex ante, to enter into a long-term
contract; yet the number of contingencies that can arise over a
twenty year contract are such that writing a fully specified contract
is impossible. Parties thus draft a long-term contract with open
terms that they later fill by negotiation and, when negotiation fails,
by third party adjudication (either by a court or an arbitrator). In
addition, the contract includes the norms of the relationship by
reference.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORMS AND LAW: DISCHARGE
FOR CAUSE AND THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Ellickson's work and the earlier work on norms establish
that norms exist and govern behavior. Ellickson's work suggests
that norms, at least in business contexts, are generally joint-
profit maximizing. When you combine these -two hypotheses, the
next step seems almost inescapable: if the norms exist and
maximize the joint profits of the participants, then of course the
law should incorporate and enforce them. After all, the parties,
by their own actions, have demonstrated that they wish to live
by these rules. In the absence of third party effects (the con-
stant assumption here), what business do the courts have enforc-
ing any other rule? As we show in this Part-through an analysis
of the coexistence of a norm of "discharge only for cause" with a
legal rule of "employment-at-will"-this deeply held intuition is
wrong.
"4 See id. at 91-95; Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long.Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1, 23. There is an extensive
literature on relational contracting beginning with the pioneering contributions of
Goetz and Scott. Much of this literature discusses how to fill in the inevitable gaps.
Generally, the literature concludes that the joint-profit maximizing norms of the
contracting parties should fill in the gaps. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1099 (1981).
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A. "No Discharge Without Cause" As an
Incentive-Compatible Contract Term
We know that generally, even in non-union firms, the norm
governing termination is "no discharge without cause." One can
understand the persistence of this norm, even in a legal world in
which "employment-at-will" predominates, on the same basis as
described above.5 A norm of "discharge for cause," in contrast to
a reduction in wage rates, is joint-profit maximizing for the parties
because it induces optimal investment in match. If the firm could
discharge without cause, it could use such a threat to appropriate an
additional share of the joint surplus ex post. The threat of such ex
post appropriation would, as in the earlier analyses, stand in the way
of optimal investments in match ex ante.
In general, and in most cases, such a provision can be expected
to be self-enforcing, for reasons introduced in Part I. Firms will not
discharge employees without cause because if they did so they
would lose the benefit of that employee. By contrast, if the norm
provided for a wage reduction when firms detected shirking, the
firm would have an incentive for claiming shirking even though it
never occurred. In such a case, the firm could retain the valued
employee, while having higher profits from the wage reduction.
The role of discharge for cause plays an important role in
allowing the ILM parties to use norms rather than laws. For norms
to work, the parties must have power to administer sanctions.
Discharge serves that purpose in the ILM.
For norms to be self-sustaining, however, the parties must have
the power to administer sanctions. Ellickson's account of Shasta
County demonstrates the importance of the availability of adequate
sanctions. There, the neighbors have a limited set of options,
" There is an enormous literature on "employment-at-will" including prominent
contributions attacking the doctrine on various grounds. See e.g., Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967) (arguing that the at-will doctrine does
little to protect an economically dependent employee from employer power); Clyde
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Discharge: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481,483 (1976) (criticizing the at-will doctrine for leaving a majority of workers
without protection against arbitrary discipline). A number of articles analyze the
doctrine and the arguments against it from a law and economics perspective. See
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. PolsbyJust Cause for Termination Rules and Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989); StewartJ. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommo-
dating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
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including negative gossip and social ostracism."6 In addition, they
sometimes employ physical, sometimes unlawful, self-help. The
difficulties they had with Frank Ellis illustrate the weakness of
the available sanctions. The good players had difficulties dealing
with him because of limited ability to apply sanctions that were
meaningful to him. He was unfazed by negative gossip. Unlike the
ILM scenario, where a firm can discharge a bad player, bad
neighbors can stay put. In the end, as in a fairy tale, bad things
happened to Ellis, and he eventually went bankrupt and moved. But
absent such "acts of God or nature," the good players faced a
difficult situation.
In the ILM, employees likewise have sanctions available to
discipline the errant employer. First, when firms are continuing in
business, reputational effects will push them to avoid opportunistic
behavior. For the repeat player, departure from the norm will
impose costs on the employer: in hiring new employees, in
discouraging workers from making investments in match, in "loss of
morale" among existing employees (for example, in a self-deter-
mined and relatively unsanctionable reduction in output), and in
higher wages. For a large employer, the benefit of acting
opportunistically with respect to a particular employee will thus be
offset by the increased costs of all the other employees, aggregat-
ed.-" Second, employees can engage in hard to detect, but often
effective, work slowdowns (what in England is called "work-to-rule").
Third, as we discuss further below, employees can discipline the bad
norm player (employer) by forming a union and replacing the
system of norms with a collective bargaining agreement.
' Gossip on the job plays the same critical role as does gossip among neighbors.
Gossip among employees spreads the required information as to whether the
employer follows the norms, and is thus a good employer, or does not, and is thus
a bad employer. In doing so, gossip lowers the cost of information asymmetries
among employees. Employees can differentiate the good employees from the bad,
at lower cost than can the employer. For discharge-for-cause to function as a norm,
employees must be able to validate that a discharged employee violated the norm and
was indeed shirking.
" H. Lorne Carmichael emphasizes the importance ofreputational effects in labor
markets. See H. Lorne Carmichael, Reputation in the Labor Marke 74 AMER. EcON.
REv. 713, 713-25 (1984). The significance of these costs and the extent to which they
adequately restrain opportunistic firing of employees during the "payback" period are
empirical questions. The persistence of "at-will employment" in unregulated markets
provides some evidence (albeit perhaps not conclusive evidence) that these restraints
sufficiently constrain such behavior. For a fuller discussion of this question, see
Epstein, supra note 35, at 967-68; Freed & Polsby, supra note 35, at 1127-30; Schwab,
supra note 35, at 26-28.
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Norms work least well when the power of future sanctions is
eliminated or reduced. This scenario most often occurs when an
employer has a reasonable prospect of going out of business. This
raises the "end-game" problem and converts a relationship that is
near termination from a repeat game into a nonrepeat one.
Because most firms go out of business in steps, employees can
protect themselves by reducing their investments in match, thereby
reducing their losses if forced to switch employers. Alternatively,
employees can protect their interests through contract. We
discussed this issue in the context of the relational commercial
contract above. We will discuss the general issue of choosing
between contracts and norms in the ILM context in Part III below.
B. Why Norms Should Not Be Enforced By Courts
If non-union ILMs have a norm of "no discharge without cause,"
why are parties who have committed themselves to a norm of "no
discharge without cause" in non-union ILMs, unwilling to back that
commitment with legal enforceability? Why rely on norms to self-
enforce, when the option of third party enforcement is available?
There are two primary explanations: the difficulty in accurately
verifying that "cause" exists and the inability of third parties to
enforce highly incomplete contracts.
Suppose that the employer needed to prove "just cause." As a
starting point, proving cause to a court would require that the
employer engage in additional detection costs. It is always more
difficult to prove a case to a third party than to learn the facts
independently. This alone reduces the value of the match.
But what set of facts would constitute cause? Flagrant bad play,
as in the case of Frank Ellis, might be easy to prove, but provides
little guidance. Since the ILM parties want to minimize monitoring
or detection costs, they want the penalty to be large relative to the
damages from any violation. This means that the courts would have
to determine whether a relatively minor violation of a norm was
meaningful enough to constitute "cause" for discharge. Doing so
would be a daunting task. The court would need to learn about the
relevant norm, 8 the damages caused by the violation of the norm,
the probability of detection and punishment, and the effect of the
sanction on providing optimal incentives for other employees.
" For example, does one or several cases of shirking constitute just cause
according to the norm?
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The difficulty of valuing match-specific investments increases the
likelihood of error when third parties enforce norms. In valuing
assets, third parties typically rely on market prices. Valuations of
match-specific investments, by contrast, rely on the parties' own
valuations. From the employer's perspective, just cause exists when
the continuation of the match with the particular employee has a
negative net present value, including the reputational cost of taking
too tough or too easy a stance in the face of the perceived violation.
The problem is that a third party could not verify the firm's own net
present value calculation at low cost and perhaps not at all. Courts
would therefore be prone to reaching erroneous decisions.
s9
Proof for the assertion that courts would find it difficult to
resolve non-union ILM disputes manifests itself in the widespread
use of arbitration clauses in similar types of relationships. For
example, in ongoing relational commercial contracts and union
ILMs, where third party enforcement is common, the parties often
rely on arbitrators who specialize in resolving problems for that
particular match. This behavior illustrates the difficulty of relying
on the courts. Although arbitrators may generate fewer costs than
courts, including the costs of verifying asset specific valuations and
incorrect decisions, the costs would still be high.
Generally, when the facts needed to resolve disputes are difficult
to verify, the parties themselves are in a better position than a third
party to evaluate them. In such cases, norms built around self-
enforcing rules are superior to third party enforcement. Ellickson
also supports this conclusion, which plays a large role in the
incentive-compatible economics literature.
The second explanation for why norm based relationships are
not amenable to third party enforcement involves the issue of
incomplete contracts. When agreements are built primarily around
norms, any contract will be highly incomplete. In the extreme case,
there may be no contract at all. The more incomplete the contract,
the more limited the court's ability to infer the parties' intentions.
Schwartz has pointed out that courts take one of two very
different approaches when confronted with an alleged contract
breach.4" In cases where the courts find a detailed, albeit incom-
plete contract, they take an activist stance, attempting to fill in the
gaps in the contract. Courts fill in the gaps based on their interpre-
" See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Contracts andJudicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 313-15 (1992).
41 See id. at 271-74.
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tation of what the parties would have agreed to had they known that
the contingency would arise. In doing so, the courts help the
parties maximize the value of their exchange. Contract writing is
costly, and contracts will always be incomplete. By filling in the
gaps in such a manner, contract law serves the joint welfare
maximizing interests of the parties.
When confronted by a highly incomplete contract, the courts
typically become passive, treating whatever language exists as
the complete contract. As Schwartz points out, in such cases,
courts deem the contract complete-without gaps for the courts to
fill.4 Courts take this position not because they really believe that
the contract is complete-it clearly is not-rather, because they do
not know how to fill in the gaps in a manner that assists the parties
in maximizing their joint profits. The more incomplete the
contract, the more limited the court's ability to infer the parties'
intentions.
Information asymmetries pose a related hurdle to an activist
court. Information asymmetries may render a contract incomplete
because they prevent third parties from observing or verifying
relevant information. One type of information asymmetry,
mentioned above, involves the parties' valuation of their asset. If
the relevant information concerning a variable is unobservable or
nonverifiable, the parties will not condition a promise on its
outcome, and a third party cannot enforce it. The only solution is
to adopt a self-enforcing contract term. These information
asymmetries drive the development of the ILM's self-enforcing
terms.
42
41 See id.
' If the court endeavors to serve the parties, it will hesitate to override their
conscious decision to leave the contract incomplete. It will not require more
disclosure from the informed party than the contract demands. In such cases, the
court views the parties as unwilling to force the information asymmetry into the open,
presumably because doing so would entail high costs.
The term "contract gap" describes inadvertent missing terms in the contract.
Gaps do not include areas that the parties did not intend the contract to cover.
Instead, the court treats the contract as complete and does not consider the missing
areas part of the contract. Historically, courts have been unwilling to assume the
degree of activism necessary to broaden the scope of a contract beyond its intended
limits.
Commentators disagree on this issue. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner suggest that
the courts establish penalty defaults. By "penalty defaults," they mean defaults that
the parties would not choose on their own because they thwart rent-seeking ends. See
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 735-36 (1992). But the penalty defaults that the courts
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In the absence of clear evidence that the governance structure
has failed the parties, third party enforcement-an activist judicial
approach-will likely reduce the joint-profits of the parties. Suppose
that, in spite of the aforementioned problems, the courts developed
a rule which required the firm to prove the case of shirking to a
third party even in the absence of explicit or implicit contract
terms.4- In response to this uninvited policy innovation, the
parties would have a number of alternative options. First, they
might adopt an explicit term either specifically ruling out a
requirement of providing proof to third parties, or indicating under
what circumstances to enforce such a requirement." Absent public
policy to the contrary, even an activist court would enforce explicit
contractual language. But requiring the parties to complete
contracts, when they otherwise would not do so, forces them to
incur extra costs.
Second, parties could incorporate the court-imposed rules and
standards of proof into their relationship. This incorporation will
most likely occur when the cost of the court-imposed inefficiencies
is relatively low and when the parties can mitigate those costs by
adopting alternative strategies. Finally, the parties might decrease
adopt appear to mirror the self-enforcing contracts that the parties would indeed
adopt on their own. Moreoverjason S.Johnston challenges Ayres's and Gertner's
emphasis on information revealing rules. SeeJason S.Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). Johnston
shows that the choice of rules is consistent with game-theory results which would
allow the parties to be silent with respect to the profits they expect from the contract.
See id. at 627-30.
1 For a discussion of this issue, see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Rights:
Rethinking Protective LaborLegislation, in 8 RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONoMICS 285,290-
97 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 1986) (discussing proposed labor reforms of the
employment-at-will doctrine to provide non-union workers protection against "unjust
dismissal").
41 Where courts have altered the default rule of employment-at-will by enforcing
language in employer handbooks as "implied contracts" or "implied terms,"
employers have tended to return to the prior default by memorializing the default in
explicit language. On the enforceability of employee handbooks, see generally 1 E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.15a (1990); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980s: The Top Ten, 41 CAsE W.
RES. L. REV. 203, 206-10 (1990); Winters, supra note 13.
The ability of employers to avoid "implied terms" by explicit contractual terms
is consistent with general principles of contract law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208(2) ("The
express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as any
course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms
shall control course of performance and course of performance shall control both
course of dealing and usage of trade (Section 1-205).").
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the intensity of use of the ILM relationship by making greater use
of ELM contracts whenever possible and decreasing their joint
investments in match-specific investments.
A middle ground would be to establish a default rule that stated
that third party proof would be required unless the parties expressly
agreed to waive the requirement. The costs of such a requirement
would depend on the breadth of the default rule. For example, if
the default rule applied broadly, it could mean that third party
proof would be required to fire a seasonal, part-time worker, absent
waiver. On the other hand, the cost could be relatively small if the
requirement of explicit waiver were narrowly construed and if the
parties were allowed to adopt broad or "boilerplate" contract
language waiving third party enforcement across all issues. Making
the middle ground the default would have the effect of forcing the
employer to write the waiver into a contract. In doing so, the
employer would be notifying the workers of their limited rights,
thus allowing workers to adjust their behavior accordingly. If this
were the rule, the standard non-union ILM contract would include
but the single, employment-at-will term.
Such a middle ground is a negative default in the spirit of Ayres
and Gertner.4 6 An interesting question is whether judicial activism
should attempt to push the parties further into a broader, middle-
ground contract setting. For example, should the courts interpret
the terms of the employee handbook as contract terms? Our answer
is that the employment contract does not constitute middle-ground
contract terms. Rather than being contract terms, the prototypical
employee handbook contains the parties' agreed upon norms.
Writing the handbook is not akin to writing a contract. Instead, it
is the cost efficient mechanism for communicating norms to the
ILM community. For reasons discussed below, employment
contracts tend to be bipolar, with at most a narrow middle
ground.4
41 SeeJames N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, Employnent Effects of Worker Protection:
Evidence from the United States, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET
BEHAVIOR 215, 215-27 (Christoph F. Buechtemann ed., 1993).
'4 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 42. For commentators concerned that the ILM
is fraught with employer opportunism, the middle ground provides little additional
protection to workers. To the traditional labor law scholars, for example, only the
polar case of union contract can protect employees.
47 Other terms that can fit into middle ground are severance provisions or other
provisions that deal with the effects of the termination of the relationship. However,
the middle ground would not contain terms that govern the functioning of the
ongoing ILM relationship.
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Statutory intervention is potentially more troublesome than
court intervention because policymakers are likely to be more
willing to override the expressed intent of the parties and it is more
difficult to contract around statutory terms. For example, a statute
making the norm "no discharge without cause" legally enforceable
would undermine the norm-based system discussed above which
protects all those employees for whom the norm is incentive-
compatible, in order to provide protection for those employees
subject to employer opportunism and who cannot protect them-
selves through unionization.
Another interesting example involves the rule against mandatory
retirement. One of the most prevalent stylized practices of non-
union ILMs prior to the prohibition of such rules was the term or
norm specifying a mandatory age of retirement. With the mandato-
ry retirement norm in effect, an associated norm provided that
firms would not discharge employees whose performance failed to
meet threshold requirements in the years immediately prior to
retirement. Employers who discharged older employees violated the
norm and acted opportunistically. The mandatory retirement term
replaced difficult to observe terms (effort and performance) with an
easily observable term (age).
How are the parties likely to respond to this statutory interven-
tion? One possibility, and perhaps the one that would be predicted
by Ellickson, is that older employees would continue to honor the
norm governing retirement age. Preliminary evidence suggests that
this is not the case, at least not at age sixty-five. Of the three
strategies noted above, overwriting the rule is obviously not
possible. Reducing the intensity of use of ILMs is possible and
would add to other statutory interventions that appear to have made
certain ILMs less profitable. The second strategy-live with the rule
but mitigate its effects-is most likely. In particular, discharge for
cause of older employees is likely to become more common. Such
an increase would not be, and should not be viewed as, discrimina-
tory in that the incidence of termination for cause would increase
toward the rate for younger employees.
This theory thus suggests that activist judicial intervention in
ILM governance structures is unlikely to improve the joint profits
of the parties." In the face of incomplete contracts and informa-
4' To the extent that the norm against discharge without cause is designed to
protect deferred compensation, the employer will have an increased incentive to
discharge as the employee moves into the "payback" period. Stewart Schwab has
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tion asymmetries, individual courts would find it difficult to write
contract terms that would maximize joint profits. Even if one
assumes that the parties have failed to negotiate the optimal
contract, the ability of courts to know which terms would improve
the contract, rather than impair it, is suspect. Thus, in these
contexts, if the courts or the legislature make norms enforceable
when doing so is not joint-profit maximizing for the parties, the
unanticipated and undesired effect will be to cause the parties
either to contract around the term, if permitted, or to abandon the
norm-governed relationship entirely.
C. Statement of the Thesis
If the foregoing analysis is generally correct, it points towards a
specific and perhaps counterintuitive thesis about the relationship
between norms and law: when a system of norms is self-sustaining
and does not impose costs on third parties, the courts should not
enforce those norms. Rather, the courts should do nothing,
adopting a rule which, although different in substance from the
pattern of behavior that the parties themselves follow, forces the
parties to rely on the self-enforcing properties of their arrangement.
When a norm is self- enforcing, judicial enforcement only provides
opportunities for abuse without any off-setting benefits. Thus, in
the ILM context, to the extent that incentive-compatible norms
evolve to solve the contracting problems that interfere with the
parties' abilities to protect match-specific investments, those norms
should not generally be enforceable at law. On this analysis, the
fact that elaborate norms protecting workers' investments in match
against ex post appropriation by firms (and vice versa) coexist with
a regime of "employment-at-will" makes perfect sense, and does not
reflect the sort of "gap" that the courts should fill with norms.
Likewise, the fact that firms tend to contract around encroachments
on the doctrine is likewise consistent and unsurprising. From this
perspective, even if the courts of Shasta County concluded that the
argued that many of the departures from employment-at-will reflect attempts to
protect against such "opportunistic" behavior. See Schwab, supra note 35. Schwab's
argument does not address the question of whether the norms are sufficiently strong
to protect against such behavior (and thus whetherjudicial intervention is necessary
in such circumstances). Rather, he makes the positive claim that the cases represent
an attempt to protect against opportunistic behavior by the employer. But this
reasoning immediately raises a red flag: if the parties could not solve the problem
of opportunism by themselves, as Schwab supposes that the courts hypothesize, why
is it that the parties did not address the problem contractually?
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ranchers' norm governing the allocation of the costs of fencing was
joint-profit maximizing, they should not enforce it.
Note that our defense of employment-at-will differs substantially
from that offered by Richard Epstein.49 In essence, Epstein argues
that employment-at-will is the parties' equilibrium choice.50 This
means that, to contract for greater protection than offered by
employment-at-will, the employees would have to trade off more in
wages and benefits than they would be willing to sacrifice. We
argue, on the other hand, that most employees work under a norm
that offers considerably more protection than employment-at-will.
Our argument will not, however, assuage critics of employment
at-will, like Paul Weiler, in the least.5 They assert that all employ-
ees should receive protection from wrongful discharge, either
through union CBAs or stringent court protection.52 We argue
49 See Epstein, supra note 35, at 982 (arguing that employment-at-will affords
flexibility for the "ceaseless marginal adjustments that are necessary in any on-going
productive activity" conducted under conditions of change). Because we emphasize
the costs of litigating "just cause" and related cases, our analysis does not deal with
the class of statutory interventions such as the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act that provide for minimum terms in retirement plans. In addition, as a
conceptual matter, our defense of employment-at-will would not apply to special
public policy goals such as Tide VII. Of course, as more groups receive additional
protection, less remains of the doctrine.
'0 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 147-58 (1992).
5' See WEILER, supra note 14, at 48-104. Some will also argue that the foregoing
discussion is unconvincing because it puts the rabbit in the hat: if one assumes that
employment markets are reasonably efficient and that workers have choices and can
contract freely, then reasonably efficient outcomes will result from the freedom of
contract. The problem, according to such critics, is precisely that workers cannot
contract freely: they lack choices, information, and contractual capacity. The essence
of the attack on the employment-at-will doctrine is that workers, because they are
weak in comparison to employers, cannot protect themselves.
A full response to this argument transcends the scope of this Article. For a
thorough reply to the argument, see Epstein, supra note 35; Freed & Polsby, supra
note 35.
Because incentive-compatible contractual structures characterize a variety of
"incomplete" contracts, many of which involve parties of relatively equal bargaining
power, the claimed incapacity of workers cannot completely explain the persistence
of such structures in the non-union sector.
" This is the position taken by Walter Kamiat in his Comment on our Article,
when he states that the lack of contractual protection from discharge "may reflect
serious contracting problems in the non-union internal labor market."
Professor Kamiat suggests that employees do not request contract language
stating"no discharge without cause" lest they be signalling that they are "lemons," in
the spirit of Akerlof's famous article. See George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons .•
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 08 (1970). But the
problem is not an "employee-as-lemon" problem at all. In ajust-cause regime, low
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that most employees already enjoy that protection via norms. If we
are correct, then employees working in efficient, norm-governed
ILMs have a better overall package than would Weiler's employees
working with court protection.
III. TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN NORMS AND LAW
In this Part, we try to sketch out a more general theory of
the relation between norms and law. To do so, we first discuss
the alternative to relying on norms, that is, contract, and some
of the factors that push parties to choose one or the other. We
then turn to the conditions necessary to maintain competition
between these two alternatives and the implications of that
competition.
A. The Other Half of the Analysis: The Choice
to Write a Contract
In Shasta County, in commercial interactions, and in labor
markets, one observes the use of norms as well as the use of
contracts. What factors explain the choice between the two options?
productivity employees are no more protected than they are in a norm-governed
relationship. In either case, they are appropriately discharged for cause. On the
other hand, the employee who demands contractual protection against arbitrary
dismissal may do so for fear that the employer is a lemon. We discuss this below in
noting that perceived employer untrustworthiness is one reason why employees
choose the union ILM.
For Professor Kamiat's model to work, the just-cause provision, whether
incorporated in an individual or collectively bargained contract must better
protect the shirking employees than does the norm regime. This does not provide an
attractive defense for the existence of just-cause contractual protection, and we
doubt that it is correct. The ILM, whether union or non-union, is a relationship of
frequent repeat-plays. The low productivity employee is inevitably discharged.
More generally, Professor Kamiat, like others who take a traditional approach to
labor law, fails to appreciate the connection between the existence and viability of this
system of norms and the doctrine of employment-at-will which, as we argue in the
text, is what makes the norms self-regulating. For example, Kamiat argues that the
widespread adoption ofjust-cause protection in union contracts reflects employees'
interest in such protection and that its absence from non-union contracts thus reflects
market failure. But, where norms are adequately self-enforcing, non-union employees
enjoy all of the protections without writing them into the contract. The gulf between
the union contract and the non-union governance mechanism is not indicative of
market failure, but of the ability of parties working as a close-knit group to enjoy all
of the protection of contract without the cost of writing and enforcing those
contracts.
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1. What Is the Difference Between Norms and Contract?
A striking feature of labor markets is that contracting is
polarized: either firms opt for almost entirely unwritten (and
unenforceable) agreements or firms adopt intricate, detailed,
written contracts, along with governance mechanisms for adjudicat-
ing disputes and filling in gaps. The non-union sector relies on
unwritten and unenforceable contracts while the union sector uses
detailed collective bargaining agreements.
In union workplaces, parties typically negotiate detailed terms
and, when disputes arise, resort to legally mandated grievance
procedures, with arbitration as a final step. In a grievance, the
parties will first try to negotiate a resolution, in effect, renegotiating
the terms of the contract, or, perhaps more precisely, negotiating
to fill in gaps that were (often intentionally) left in the contract at
the time of signing. When the parties fail to negotiate a solution,
and an arbitrator adjudicates the dispute, the arbitrator will look to
the practices of the ILM in order to fill in the gaps. Here, one
observes incorporation of norms in contract interpretation. Indeed,
one of the perceived advantages of labor arbitration over court
enforcement involves the greater familiarity that an arbitrator is
thought to have with firm and industry norms.
53
But note a significant difference with the non-union sector: in
incorporating norms into their contract by means of the arbitration
provision, the union sector, paradoxically, relies on norms less than
the non-union sector, where the relationship hinges almost entirely
upon norms. In the non-union sector, parties precommit not to use
third party enforcement.
5 As stated in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960):
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the
parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate....
[Moreover, a]rbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to
provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the
variant needs and desires of the parties.
Id. at 578, 581; see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568
(1960) ("Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator .... The courts, therefore, have no business weighing
the merits of the grievance."); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) ("[Arbitrators] sit to settle disputes at the plant level-
disputes that require for their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a
particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular agreements.").
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This commitment not to use third party enforcement distin-
guishes norm-dominated interactions. The norm against suing
other ranchers is an intrinsic feature of the norm-structured
resolution of cattle trespass and fencing disputes in Shasta County.
The employment-at-will doctrine which protects non-union ILMs
from third party enforcement is intrinsic to the self-enforcing
character of the interactions. From this perspective, the link
between explicit contracting and third party enforcement becomes
more clear: the choice to write contracts is fundamentally a choice
to move from a relationship governed by norms to a relationship
with enforcement by state actors.
2. When Will Parties Choose Third Party Enforcement?
When will parties choose third party enforcement (contracts)
over norms? The answer must lie in the ability to construct self-
enforcing contracts. If the parties can construct incentive-compati-
ble contracts that encourage joint-profit maximization and are self-
enforcing, then they will use norms rather than contracts. This
answer, however, is somewhat definitional. What predicts when self-
enforcing contract terms are likely to be available? The answer
seems to be that the choice is not driven by either match-specific
investments or asymmetric information directly, but rather, by the
difference in the binding power of norms versus contracts.
To understand when norms will work, one must understand why
norms dominate in both Shasta County and the non-union ILM, two
very different circumstances, but fail in commercial power plant!
coal mine type relational contracts and union ILMs. We will focus
first on the norm side and then shift to the contract side.
Shasta County is a Coasian-type world of low transaction costs,
where interactions are sporadic, unconnected, low stake, and
simple. The high transaction cost ILM interactions, on the other
hand, are high frequency, connected, and complex. How can such
very different circumstances share a reliance on norms?
Shasta County and the non-union ILM, although differing in
significant ways, are fundamentally similar in salient respects. Both
are repeat-play situations (occasional in Shasta County, but con-
tinuous in the ILM) in which the parties can enforce sanctions
against each other. In Ellickson's terminology, both are close-knit
groups.54 In both, the stakes for individual plays are sufficiently low
54 See ELLICKSON, Supra note 1.
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so that the benefits of defecting will not likely outweigh the ongoing
value of the relationship to the parties. In other words, the
agreements will self-enforce.
The fundamental difference between Shasta County and the
non-union ILM-the fact that Shasta County involves market
transactions governed by norms while the non-union ILM exists
within a firm-tracks a very different question than that of norms
versus contracts, and does not undermine the analysis of when
norms will likely work. Rather, the difference tracks the distinction
between organizing economic transactions through the market
versus organizing transactions within a firm.55 The dominance of
norm-governed transactions within firms should not be surprising:
Coase himself cited bringing activities within the firm as a way of
internalizing externalities in a high transaction cost world.56
' In terms of the extent of economic activity, within-firm norms are clearly the
most important home of norm-directed activity. Thus, we think that Shasta County
is the marginal case and the ILM the central case for the use of norms.
Moreover, the industrial organization literature dealing with the theory of the
firm points to exactly these factors-high frequency, connectedness, and complexity-
as key components of an economic transaction that is best coordinated by bringing
the activity inside the firm. More generally, firms organize activity when resorting
to the intrafirm authority relationship costs less than writing contracts and using the
market. In the ILM, it would be prohibitively costly to write individual contracts to
organize tasks.
As Milgrom and Roberts have argued, intrafirm organization is superior (1) the
greater the specificity of the investments involved in the transaction; (2) the higher
the frequency and the longer the duration of the transaction; (3) the more uncertain
and more complex the needed performance; (4) the more difficult the measurement
of performance; and (5) the more connected the tasks. See PAUL R. MILGROM &JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1992).
-' See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394 (1937).
Indeed, as we argue elsewhere, the advantages of norms provide the best answer to
Coase's question on the difference between firms and markets. Coase argued that
firms and markets differ in that firms use contracts and authority relationships, with
the choice driven by the relative transaction costs. See id. at 391-92. In their
important contribution to the debate, Alchian and Demsetz pointed out that, contrary
to Coase, there are often contracts within the firm and authority relationships within
the market. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 794 (1972) (describing the
classical firm as a contractual structure in which no authoritarian control is involved);
see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26J.L. & ECON. 1, 3
(1983) (arguing that the word "firm" is used to denote the organization of activities
under contractual arrangements that are unlike the arrangements in ordinary product
markets); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757,1761 (1989) (noting the conceptual weakness in the dichotomy between
the role of authority within the firm and the role of consensual trade within the
market); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1978) (exploring the
1943
1944 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1913
If what unites Shasta County and the non-union ILM is that, in
both cases, self-enforcing contracts are available, how, then, should
we understand the union ILM? On the one hand, the union ILM is
like the non-union ILM in that it is brought inside the firm and is
characterized by the same types of transactions. On the other hand,
it relies more on contracts and law than on norms.
To answer this question, we turn first to the simpler case of
commercial relational contracts and norms. As discussed above, the
paradigm case for analysis in the law and economics literature on
relational contracting is the case of the coal mine next to the power
plant. For these parties, it is in their joint interest, ex ante, to enter
into a long-term contract; yet the many contingencies that can arise
over a twenty-year contract render it impossible to write a fully
specified contract. In addition, because the sunk investments in the
mine and power plant give rise to quasi-rents and the potential for
opportunistic behavior, neither side can go forward without contract
protection.
The relational contract and non-union ILMs are thus similar in
that match-specific investments motivate both of them. In the
prototypical relational contract, however, individual transactions are
often single shot and usually high stakes. In such circumstances,
even though the relationship is long term, parties cannot rely on
norms-the chances of opportunistic behavior are too great.
Instead, the parties write detailed contracts. Contracts, even
incomplete ones like those written between the coal mine and the
power plant, have a greater capacity to bind parties than do norms.
When the bonds of norms are too weak to neutralize the threat of
opportunistic behavior, the expense of contracts is justified.
To realize the benefits of the long-term nature of the match, the
parties draft long-term contracts with open terms that they later fill
by renegotiation and, when that fails, third party adjudication
(either by a court or by an arbitrator). Since the relationship
involves a long-term commitment, norms will likely develop.
Indeed, the parties will typically incorporate these norms into the
possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior in the market system). The
analysis in the text makes clear that the difference between firms and markets is that
norms, working within the hierarchical structure of the firm, are-as a descriptive
matter-the typical mode of organization within firms, while explicit contracting (even
if sometimes incomplete as in the case of long-term relational contracts) is the typical
mode of organization throughout markets. According to this analysis, the choice
between organizing production in firms or through markets amounts to a choice
between norms and contract.
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contract by reference. The norms, however, need not self-enforce.
Instead, the arbitrator orjudge resolves conflicts by interpreting the
contract and filling the inevitable gaps.
57
The critical factors driving the choice between norms and
contracts cannot be match-specific investments, asymmetric
information, or long duration. All are present in the non-union
ILM and the relational contract and largely absent in Shasta County.
Rather, the combination of large stakes and infrequent or single
play drives the parties towards a contractual solution. In these
cases, norms do not have sufficient binding power to constrain
opportunistic behavior, so the parties must resort to contract. In
short, the need to constrain defection drives the choice.
How should this analysis affect our understanding of union
OBAs? From a contractual perspective, union CBAs share many
similarities with commercial relational contracts. Both are long
term and use third party adjudication intensively, most often
through arbitration where the neutral party attempts to fill the gaps
in the contract with the norms of the parties. But does the choice
between the norm-dominated non-union sector and the incomplete
contract/CBA solution of the union sector parallel the choice
between norms and relational contracts more generally? In other
words, are CBAs relational contracts of the sort that we see between
the power plant and the coal mine?
From one perspective, the answer seems to be negative. If what
distinguishes the domain of commercial relational contracts from
norms is the existence of high stakes, single-shot transactions, then
OBAs fall on the norms side of the line: in the union, as in the non-
union sectors, there are numerous small transactions among the
same parties.
But, from a larger perspective, union ILMs more closely
resemble relational contracts than do non-union ILMs. There are
two potential explanations for the choice of the union ILM over the
non-union ILM. First, if norms imperfectly self-enforce, there will
be a class of players for whom norms do not provide sufficient
limitations to protect the parties' match-specific investments. In the
ILM context, if an employer proves untrustworthy, the parties may
opt for the contractual solution over the cheaper but less powerful
normative solution. Hence, the union ILM model fits well if the
employer is untrustworthy-a view widely held by labor unions. This
"' See Goetz & Scott, supra note 34, at 1117.
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analysis would include, but would not be limited to, the end-game
problem that occurs when the ILM lacks sufficient repeat interac-
tion.
The second explanation rests on the notion that the union ILM
is chosen in order to achieve wage premia. This is a complex
argument because it interacts with the statutory protection provided
by the NLRA. Here, again, the more powerful constraints imposed
by contract drive the choice of contracts over norms. Employers are
unlikely to be good and faithful norm players when the outcome
disfavors them in a redistributional sense. The contract also
prevents individual employees from defecting from the union norm
by offering to undercut the wage premia. According to either
explanation, the greater binding power of contracts over norms and
the greater need for constraint drive the choice.
3. But Why a Bipolar Distribution?
Assuming that contract's greater ability to bind motivates the
choice between norms and contract, why does there seem to be a
bipolar distribution of solutions, in both the ILM and commercial
contexts? Why are commercial relational contracts so detailed?
Why is there such a sharp distinction between the unwritten and
unenforceable non-union ILM and the detailed CBA of the union
ILM?
The best explanation for the bipolar choice between norms and
contracts is the similarly bipolar choice between self-enforcement
and third party enforcement. Once it is worthwhile to the parties
to write a contract, for whatever reason (to protect sunk investments
in the power plant/coal mine context, to bind the untrustworthy
employer, or to pursue union wage premia in an ILM), they must
try to write contracts that are as explicit as possible. By opting for
third party enforcement and thereby foregoing the benefits of a self-
enforcing norm-governed interaction, the parties expose themselves
to third party error and opportunistic behavior. The two available
mechanisms for minimizing this vulnerability are, first, the choice
of the third party decisionmaker (that is, providing for expert
arbitration), and, second, detailed terms to guide the decisionmaker.
Not surprisingly, one finds these provisions in both long-term
commercial relational contracts and union CBAs.
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' An additional factor in the labor context that discourages contractual forms
lying between the union and non-union models may be the NLRA's restrictions on
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B. The Benefits of Choice Among Legal Regimes
In non-union ILMs, norms dominate. In union ILMs, detailed
contingent-state contracts with specified governance structures to
fill in gaps prevail. One cannot know, a priori, which approach
is more efficient. Perhaps one model is more efficient for some
contexts while the other model works better elsewhere. In Shasta
County, although not much emphasized, norms and law likewise
coexist happily. Norms dominate with regard to trespass and
fencing matters. One can be certain, however, that when a
rancher buys or sells a ranch or property, he relies on enforceable
contracts.
The ability to choose between norms and contract provides
substantial benefits. Consider the ILM context. In the preceding
analysis, one of the explanations for choosing the union ILM over
the non-union ILM was the presence of an untrustworthy employer.
As long as norms do not perfectly self-enforce, the possibility of
opportunistic behavior will exist. The existence of the union ILM
option can therefore be expected to constrain opportunistic
behavior in the non-union ILM.
If one views the NLRA system as providing employers and firms
with a choice (adopt the NLRA specified union ILM structure or
remain non-union),59 a competition between the two forms
emerges: the non-union ILM form that uses self-enforcing norms
versus the union ILM form that uses contract and statutory law to
provide third party enforcement of agreements. In such competi-
tion, the ILM form that can best maximize joint profits will win
labor market share.6" Likewise, providing employees with an
additional weapon to sanction employers, makes firm rent-seeking
less profitable. Hence, although one might exalt the non-union ILM
as a triumph of norms over law, some of the credit may go to the
law itself: even the parties to the non-union ILM agreement bargain
in the shadow of the law. The ability to choose the union ILM
employer involvement in union activity. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990
(1992) (stating that a finding of domination may be appropriate if a union has no
effective existence independent of the employer's active involvement).
"See Wachter & Wright, supra note 25, at 256.
0 Traditional labor law scholars reject this view, arguing that the NLRA not only
created a union ILM form, but favored its acceptance. See generally WEILER, supra
note 14. Whether this view accurately reflects the original legislative intent in the
1930s is debatable, but claiming that it is a positive description of the NLRA today
is implausible.
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option provided by the NLRA may, itself, have encouraged ILM
parties to behave neighborly and not violently.
Against this background, consider the NLRA's protection of
union organization activities as an exception to the general doctrine
of at-will employment. 1 The untrustworthy employer, that is, the
bad actor who flouts the norm of "no discharge without cause" will
likely bear a cost for breaching the norm through reputational and
other internally administered sanctions. The norm will be less
credible in the future, which will affect the employees' willingness
to invest in match, in the allocation of the joint surplus, and in the
employees' willingness to rely on a norm, as opposed to an
enforceable contractual provision, to protect against opportunistic
behavior. Nonetheless, because self-enforcing norms may be
imperfect in that they do not completely self-enforce, such behavior
may still be worthwhile to the untrustworthy employer, both in the
short run as well as in the long run. If so, such an employer will
also have an incentive to discharge employees who try to organize
a union to constrain the employer's behavior with the stronger tools
of contract.
The legal rule against discharges for engaging in union organiz-
ing activities is important because such behavior threatens the
choice between union and non-union workplaces, and thus the
competition between the two regimes. Just as, in the corporate
context, the restrictions that antitakeover statutes place on
reincorporation provide a disincentive for managers to manage well,
so, too, would interfering with the ability of non-union ILMs to
"reincorporate" as union ILMs (and vice versa) hinder the process
that renders the norms of such ILMs joint-profit maximizing.6 2
Moreover, it is clear why such a rule must be a legal rule and not a
norm: it only matters in situations where the firm's incentives to
breach the norm outweigh any cost it is likely to face, and therefore
the normal incentive compatibility disappears. When one confronts
a player for whom the norm is not self-enforcing, the benefit of
constraining such a player may outweigh the resulting problems of
observability and verifiability, even though using law to constrain
" It is well settled that firing an employee for union organizing activities is an
unfair labor practice. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)
(noting that § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA "prohibits interference, restraint or coercion of
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization").
62 For an analogous argument in the corporate context, see ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW 67 (1993) (noting that antitakeover statutes entrench
management).
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the player will run into the problems that gave birth to the norm-
based system in the first place, for example, asymmetry of informa-
tion.
Although the integrity of the union ILM alternative depends on
legal intervention, the integrity of the non-union ILM depends on
non-intervention. Regulation of properly working self-enforcing
norms renders non-union ILMs less efficient. Despite the hopes of
the traditional legal scholars, such intervention will not encourage
greater unionization. The external labor market-through the use
of subcontracting, personal service contracts, and other such
relational contracts-is a closer substitute than the union ILM for
parties seeking to make match investments with the least amount of
legal intervention.
The same benefits of choice between norms and law exist, at
least implicitly, in Shasta County. The ranchers are keenly aware of
the existence of legally enforceable contracts: they surely encounter
such beasts when they buy and sell cattle, ranches, and cars. Their
decision to forego the use of contracts in resolving questions of cost
allocation of fencing among adjoining ranches does not argue for
the irrelevance of law. Rather, their choice only argues for the
relative superiority of norms in the particular context.
In this connection, the tale of Frank Ellis becomes important.
The informal, norm-based sanctions failed to constrain his behavior.
Only his fortuitous bankruptcy and departure solved the problem.
Had he remained in Shasta County, his neighbors would have had
three options. First, his neighbors could have done nothing-an
adequate response in the face of minimal harm. Second, the
neighbors might have engaged in more aggressive (and likely illegal)
self-help, risking the escalation of violence. Third, the neighbors
may have rejected norms in their dealings with Ellis and insisted
instead on law and contracts.
For all the interesting and important cases, the first option (do
nothing because the stakes are too small to bother with) is unavail-
able. The choice between the second and the third options
implicates the Hobbesian thesis that Ellickson so quickly dismisses-
that without a Leviathan to issue and enforce commands, civil strife
would ensue. 3 The history of the American labor movement and
63 See ELiCKSON, supra note 1, at 4-5 ("In so doing, Coase repeated a blunder that
dates back at least to Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, without a Leviathan
(government) to issue and enforce commands, all would be endless civil strife. The
Shasta County evidence shows that Hobbes was much too quick to equate anarchy
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the success of the NLRA in ending the cycle of violence between
employers and employees provide strong evidence of the impor-
tance of law in constraining and improving norm-governed
interactions. By contrast, the apparent independence of law and
norms in Shasta County may simply be an artifact of the small size
and unimportance of the transactions at issue.
If this assertion is right, then the apparent independence of
norms from law-whether in Shasta County or in the non-union
sector-is more apparent than real. If norms work in Shasta County
or the non-union ILM, they most likely function, at least in part,
because of the alternative contractual regime that lurks in the
background.
CONCLUSION
This brings us to our rather tentative conclusions. Norms are
a species of self-enforcing relationship, and the choice between
norms and contract is the choice between self-enforcement and
third party enforcement. When parties choose to adhere to norms
by not writing contracts, the efficiency minded court will stay out,
even when the norms are joint-profit maximizing. The reason for
this judicial abstention is that the efficiency of a norm-dominated
regime lies in its self-enforcing character. Attempting to enforce
norms in court is meddlesome and negates the very promise that
norms offer the parties.
This is a very important conclusion because it contradicts a
deeply felt and widely held intuition that if the patterns of behavior
that contracting parties follow differ from the legal rules, the legal
rules should change. The extended discussion of the employment-
at-will doctrine shows that the existence of a norm and a substan-
tively inconsistent legal rule may, in fact, be optimal. More
generally, even if one is unconvinced of the virtues of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, the analysis shows that an additional step is
involved, and an additional argument required, to move from the
identification of a difference between a norm and a legal rule to the
conclusion that the law should change or that the courts should
enforce the norm. This conclusion does not automatically follow."
with chaos. Many entitlements, especially workaday entitlements, can arise
spontaneously. People may supplement, and indeed preempt, the state's rules with
rules of their own.").
" In a context in which norms and law coexist and compete, the old claim that law
emerges from norms and custom, and therefore (on conceptual grounds?) cannot or
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The coexistence of self-enforcing systems of norms and state-
enforced contracts poses the question of when parties will
choose one over the other. Parties will choose contracts when
the binding power of norms fails to constrain opportunistic
behavior, as in the paradigmatic long-term, high stakes contract-
ing of the relational contracts literature. In such circumstances,
the courts have no choice but to figure out which norms the parties
intended to incorporate and which they did not. This is a sepa-
rate although related subject and well beyond the scope of this
Article.6
From this perspective, the legal regimes of norms and contracts,
far from existing in isolation from one another, provide interacting
alternatives. The competition between activities governed by norms
and those governed by contracts must be protected because it
improves the quality of each realm and protects the participants
from opportunistic behavior.
The coexistence of norms and laws does not diminish the fact
that laws trump norms, both in fact and by necessity. To say, as
Ellickson appears to in some places, that norms do not form in the
shadow of the law is troublesome and we believe incorrect. The
shadow of the law is critical to well-functioning norms. Once
parties enforce norms by unlawful self-help, they start down a very
slippery slope. The history of labor unions in the United States and
their attempts at organizing and bargaining with firms provides an
example.
Here again, the story of Shasta County's Frank Ellis illuminates
the analysis. Definitionally, Ellis was a bad player because he did
not play by the norms. He may even have been a bad person, if he
did not play by the law, but failure to play by the norms is not proof
of that. Once the good players retaliate by engaging in unlawful
self-help, however, they become bad persons. The essence of the
efficiency of norm-governed interactions lies in their voluntary
perhaps should not conflict with it, can no longer be persuasive. Once law assumes
a life of its own, however it got there, it competes with norms and customs as an
alternative mechanism to structure productive relationships (and many others as well).
The appropriate relation between the two thereby becomes of central importance.
' As Alan Schwartz has argued, the best guide in this task is whether the terms
depend on verifiable or nonverifiable information. This asymmetry of information,
which is part of what drives the choice to use norms over contracts, likewise
constrains the courts in interpreting contracts, notwithstanding the fact that other
considerations push the parties to write contracts. See Schwartz, supra note 39, at
282-83.
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character. If Ellis does not agree to join in the norms, for whatever
personal reasons, he becomes indistinguishable from a third party.
If the norms injure him, he has a right to ask for legal remedy. This
is typically not a problem in the United States today, but only
because norms operate so clearly in the shadow of the law. Only
Frank Ellis's exit from Shasta County made it unnecessary for the
law to enter the fray against the bad persons, whether or not they
were bad or good norm players.
These conclusions leave open some important questions. What
sort of evidence is necessary before one concludes that the parties
are operating according to norms and not law? What about norms
that impose costs on third parties while benefiting the participants?
What is the cost of incorrectly enforcing norms? And, finally, when
should courts read contracts as incorporating norms, and what
norms should they incorporate?
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6If we correctly conclude that the choice to write a contract amounts to a choice
between norm-governed relationships and third party enforcement, then clear
demarcation may be useful. Although the question transcends the scope of this
Article, contracting formalities, whether they be of the seal type or the statute of
frauds type, can serve this purpose.
